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[This article examines the issues surrounding bioprospecting for potential resources from areas 
outside national jurisdiction. Bioprospecting is attracting attention in international law because 
there is a lack of clarity in the interplay between sovereign rights over biological resources and 
intellectual property rights in inventions developed from those resources. The situation is even 
more complex where sovereign rights are disputed or absent. This article focuses on the 
Antarctic and the Southern Ocean because, although this region is in the administrative custody 
of 45 state parties to the Antarctic Treaty, the status of Antarctic resources is legally unclear. 
While there may not be direct conflict between the Antarctic legal regime and other international 
regimes, including the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
neither does the legal regime provide adequate guidance in the treatment of resources from 
global commons areas. An examination of the issues has led the authors to conclude that at the 
very least the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties should make clear their collective policy on 
bioprospecting before the industry takes hold.] 
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I INTRODUCTION 
At the start of the 21st century, the industrial world stands on the edge of a new 
revolution. The industries of the future will tap increasingly into the materials and 
processes in plants, animals and microorganisms. They will draw on the chemicals 
and genetic material of the world’s biological resources to provide new feedstocks 
and new modes of manufacture.1 
The process of tapping into the world’s biological resources is known as 
bioprospecting and its economic importance is widely recognised.2 For example, 
in Australia, it has been noted that ‘the world’s biota represents a source of raw 
materials that has the potential to replace petrochemicals as an industrial 
feedstock and to provide novel chemicals for use in drugs and other products’.3 
One of the significant features of the bioprospecting industry is that research into 
and development of new products often involves collaborative contractual 
arrangements between public institutes and the private sector, providing for 
access to collections of samples in exchange for financial support. 
Access to microbial collections is particularly important to the industry, 
because these species are recognised as sources of potential pharmaceutical and 
therapeutic compounds. Large collections of species are being created. One 
example is the Australian Collection of Antarctic Micro-Organisms (‘ACAM’), 
                                                 
 1 Standing Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, House of Representatives 
Parliament of Australia, Bioprospecting: Discoveries Changing the Future (2001) [vi].  
 2 See generally ibid; John Bowman, ‘Antarctica a Global “Hot Spot”: Biotechnology and 
Biodiversity’ (Paper presented at the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and 
Engineering Symposium, ‘Looking South: Managing Technology, Opportunities and the 
Global Environment’, Hobart, Australia, 20–21 November 2001) <http://www.atse.org.au/ 
publications/symposia/proc-2001.htm> at 1 May 2003. 
 3 See Standing Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, above n 1, [2.2]. 
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which houses around 300 species collected from the Antarctic.4 A further private 
collection of around 7400 species is held by the Cooperative Research Centre for 
the Antarctic and Southern Ocean in collaboration with Cerylid Biosciences.5 
Similar Antarctic bioprospecting activity is being undertaken by public institutes, 
in partnership with commercial enterprises, from a number of other states. In 
order to protect their investment, it is likely that commercial enterprises will 
claim intellectual property rights in the form of patents over biological resources 
sourced from Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, or at least over the 
downstream6 products resulting from further research and development. 
The process of bioprospecting can be divided into a number of phases, which 
are described in detail below. The first phase — sample collection — is likely to 
be benign from an environmental perspective because sample sizes are small. 
However, if products derived from bioprospecting activity cannot be 
synthetically produced but must be extracted from harvested biological 
resources, there will be environmental consequences. The primary focus of this 
article is not so much on the regulation of harvesting of Antarctic resources for 
bioprospecting purposes, but on the impact of bioprospecting on scientific 
activity and access to its resources by others. It is accepted that bioprospecting is 
progressive, innovative, and offers great promise for the development of new 
products that are beneficial to humankind. Therefore, it should be encouraged. 
Moreover, commercial enterprises should be rewarded for their investment in 
such activity in the form of patent rights over the end products. However, these 
claims to patent rights should not be at the cost of freedom of scientific research 
on the resources in their natural environment, nor should they be allowed 
without some sharing of the benefits that come from the use of those resources. It 
may be necessary to regulate bioprospecting, both in the Antarctic and 
elsewhere, in order to balance these conflicting interests. 
The legal regime established by the Antarctic Treaty7 is premised on freedom 
of scientific research and the exchange of observations and results for the benefit 
of humankind.8 These scientific philosophies are also widely held by the 
international community. For example, the fundamental principles in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea9 include freedom of scientific 
research in the high seas.10 In both legal regimes, however, these principles were 
enunciated long before the full potential of the bioprospecting industry was 
acknowledged. Exactly how these principles might be protected within the new 
commercial era of science is unclear. 
                                                 
 4 Wendy Pyper, ‘Biotech Bugs’ (2002) 14(3) Today’s Life Science 12. Note that the authors 
use the terminology ‘the Antarctic’ to refer to the continent of Antarctica and the Southern 
Ocean surrounding it, unless reproducing a direct quote which is inconsistent with this 
usage. 
 5 Ibid. 
 6 The term ‘downstream’ is used to denote the subsequent products from subsequent research 
and development. ‘Upstream’ is used to denote the initial products of research and 
development.  
 7 Opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 23 June 1961).  
 8 See ibid, arts II–III. 
 9 Opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 
1994) (‘LOSC’). 
 10 Ibid art 87(1)(f). 
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With regard to benefit sharing, the Antarctic and the high seas are most 
commonly referred to as global commons areas where resources are available to 
all. The finest example of this is the deep-sea bed, where mineral resources are 
deemed to be the ‘common heritage of mankind’.11 Access, ownership and 
sharing of the benefits of resource exploitation are regulated by LOSC.12 Neither 
the Antarctic Treaty nor LOSC provides specific guidance for regulating 
bioprospecting, other than by linking together some of the fundamental 
principles contained within these instruments, such as conservation and rational 
management. Other international legal regimes offer little assistance. The 
Convention on Biological Diversity13 deals with issues of conservation, 
sustainable use, and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of 
genetic resources. Although not inconsistent with either the Antarctic Treaty or 
LOSC provisions in this regard, the CBD covers only material subject to national 
jurisdiction.14 As such, material sourced from the Antarctic and the high seas are 
not subject to the same level of legal protection as state-owned resources. 
In regards to the high seas, there has been some academic commentary and 
more formal international discussions on the question of how the exploitation of 
these resources might be regulated.15 In the context of the Antarctic, the need to 
consider this question has also been recognised.16 These issues are not new. 
However, to date, the Antarctic Treaty parties have not accorded discussion of 
bioprospecting a high priority. It is the opinion of the authors that at the very 
least, the Antarctic Treaty parties should be proactive in formulating a policy for 
regulation of bioprospecting in the Antarctic to uphold the fundamental 
principles of freedom of scientific research and cooperation, and to provide 
added protection from unregulated resource use. 
Bioprospecting in global commons areas like the Antarctic and the high seas 
is likely to become increasingly controversial. Issues of ownership, access, 
sovereignty and jurisdiction are complicated and will need to be further 
elaborated as the industry develops.17 Three of the critical questions that will 
need to be addressed are examined in this article: 
1 Does the commercialisation of publicly funded science have the potential 
to place inappropriate limits on freedom of scientific investigation 
fundamental in both Antarctic and high seas law? 
                                                 
 11 Ibid art 136. 
 12 Ibid art 136. See generally ibid pts 11, 13. 
 13 Opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993) 
(‘CBD’). 
 14 Ibid art 4. 
 15 See, eg, Lyle Glowka ‘Biopropspecting, Alien Invasive Species, and Hydrothermal Vents: 
Three Emerging Legal Issues in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Diversity’ (2000) 
13 Environmental Law Journal 329. See also CBD Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical 
and Technological Advice, Marine and Coastal Biodiversity: Review, Further Elaboration 
and Refinement of the Programme of Work, United Nations Environmental Program, [11]–
[12], UN Doc UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/8/9 (25 November 2002). 
 16 See, eg, Committee for Environmental Protection, Final Report of the Committee for 
Environmental Protection (10–20 September 2002) [58]–[61] <http://www.cep.aq/ 
default.asp?casid=5305> at 1 May 2003 (‘CEP V’). 
 17 Lee Kimball, International Ocean Governance: Using International Law and Organisations 
to Manage Marine Resources Sustainably (2001) 57–8. 
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2 Should there be limitations on ownership rights over biological resources 
from global commons areas to ensure that benefits are shared equitably 
among humankind? 
3 If the answer to the above questions is yes, how should bioprospecting in 
areas outside national jurisdiction be regulated? 
This article aims to address these questions specifically within the context of 
the Antarctic Treaty and the instruments emanating from the Antarctic Treaty, 
given the lack of attention that bioprospecting in the region has received to date. 
We will also discuss some of the provisions of LOSC, but only in so far as they 
relate to the Southern Ocean.18 We consider the current Antarctic legal regime 
and how it has dealt with resource management issues in the past, particularly in 
the context of unproven legal sovereignty over the resources. We illustrate, with 
examples, some bioprospecting activity in the Antarctic, the phases of research 
and development that lead to product development from such activity, and the 
subsequent claim to intellectual property rights. The extent to which these rights 
can be asserted and protected is examined within the context of the international 
legal framework for patenting, provided by the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property19 and the legal framework for access and benefit 
sharing, provided by the CBD. The impact of intellectual property rights on 
freedom of scientific research, the sharing of common resources, and the 
equitable distribution of benefits flowing from their utilisation is described and 
analysed in order to establish why specific regulation may be necessary in the 
Antarctic context. Finally, we develop some options for regulation that the 
Antarctic Treaty parties may wish to consider. 
II THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
A The Antarctic Treaty 
The 12 original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty20 agreed that the freedom 
of scientific research and international cooperation with respect to the Antarctic 
was paramount for the good of all humanity.21 Subsequent instruments 
emanating from the Antarctic Treaty — the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals,22 the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources,23 the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
                                                 
 18 See Antarctic Treaty, above n 7, art VI. The Antarctic Treaty’s area of application is south 
of 60°S latitude, pursuant to art VI, which also reads: ‘nothing in the present Treaty shall 
prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under 
international law with regard to the high seas within that area’, leading the authors to treat 
the maritime zone south of 60°S as ‘high seas’ for the purpose of this article. 
 19 Opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299 (entered into force 1 January 1995)  
(‘TRIPS’). 
 20 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russian 
Federation (formerly USSR), South Africa, the UK and the US. 
 21 See Antarctic Treaty, above n 7, especially the language contained in the preamble, arts II, 
III and the liberal inspection and observation provisions of art VII. 
 22 Opened for signature 1 June 1972, 1080 UNTS 175 (entered into force 11 March 1978) 
(‘CCAS’). 
 23 Opened for signature 20 May 1980, 1329 UNTS 47 (entered into force 7 April 1982) 
(‘CCAMLR’). 
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Resource Activities,24 and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty25 (collectively known as the ‘Antarctic Treaty System’)26 — 
have all served to reinforce this founding philosophy. More than 40 years on, 
however, this altruistic tenor is likely to be challenged by, for instance, the 
potential for compromise between publicly funded, common-good scientific 
research and the results of commercialisation of that research effort through the 
assertion of patent rights over what many see as global commons resources. 
The Antarctic Treaty parties have traditionally reacted to challenges by 
establishing legal instruments to regulate specific activities — commercial 
sealing is regulated by the CCAS, marine living resources harvesting by the 
CCAMLR, and mineral resources activities by the Madrid Protocol. In fact, 
attempts are being made to regulate all authorised human activity27 in the 
Antarctic through the Antarctic Treaty System’s latest addition, the Madrid 
Protocol. This instrument requires that environmental impact assessment be a 
critical pre-planning exercise for all activities, including scientific research.28 
The interaction between publicly funded, common-good research and its 
commercial application, including claims to patent rights, has not yet been 
specifically addressed by the Antarctic Treaty parties as a group,29 although as 
individual states they may have regulated the use and conservation of biological 
resources through their own national laws to meet their international obligations 
under LOSC and the CBD. In the Antarctic context, it will not be simple, 
primarily because of the intractable nature of sovereignty during the life of the 
Antarctic Treaty. There is no consensus about the legal status of the Antarctic, 
ergo who owns or can exercise jurisdiction over its resources.30 Seven of the 12 
original signatories (including Australia) claim portions of the Antarctic 
continent as legal territory.31 The area between 90˚ and 150˚ west remains the 
                                                 
 24 Opened for signature 25 November 1988, 27 ILM 868 (‘CRAMRA’). The 12-month time 
period for signature expired on 25 November 1989, therefore CRAMA never entered into 
force. 
 25 Opened for signature 4 October 1991, 30 ILM 1461, art 7 (entered into force 14 January 
1998) (‘Madrid Protocol’). 
 26 The System also includes a range of internal regulations that are the products of annual 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (‘ATCMs’). 
 27 Authorised human activity is that which the Antarctic Treaty parties must give advanced 
notice of, such as for ‘all expeditions to and within Antarctica’, pursuant to the Antarctic 
Treaty, above n 7, art VII(5)(a). 
 28 See generally Madrid Protocol, above n 25, annex 1 (Environmental Impact Assessment). 
 29 Within the group, 27 of the 45 Antarctic Treaty parties have earned the right to become 
consultative parties (ie decision-makers) on the basis of their continued investment in 
scientific research activity. Their decisions are made by consensus. They are the original 
signatories (see above n 20), Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, India, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay. 
 30 For a comprehensive overview of the conundrum faced by the Antarctic Treaty parties with 
regard to sovereignty, see Keith Brennan, ‘Criteria for Access to the Resources of 
Antarctica: Alternatives, Procedure and Experience Applicable’ in Fransisco Orrego Vicuña 
(ed), Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal and Political Issues (1983) 217. Although 
this work is now 20 years old, its basic arguments are still relevant. 
 31 Gillian Triggs (ed), The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, Environment and Resources (1987) 
51. Antarctic territorial claimants are: Argentina, Chile and the UK (whose claims overlap in 
the Peninsula region); Australia, France, New Zealand and Norway. In Australia’s case, this 
also includes an Exclusive Economic Zone proclaimed in 1994 by the Maritime Legislation 
Amendment Act 1994 (Cth). 
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largest single portion of territory on earth as yet unclaimed. Two other Antarctic 
Treaty parties, the United States and the Russian Federation, reserve their rights 
to a basis of claim but the claims and reservations are suspended status quo ante 
(as they existed in 1959) by art 5 of the Antarctic Treaty.32 The application of 
sovereign jurisdiction is, therefore, the prerogative of the claimant states; those 
Antarctic Treaty parties that do not claim have a reciprocal prerogative not to 
recognise the claims of others. In other words, sovereignty (and therefore 
jurisdiction) is unproven in law. 
The Antarctic Treaty parties have had some prior experience with the 
difficulties this raises in the management of resource use. It was a key factor 
during the CRAMRA negotiations in the 1980s. The decision to develop an 
instrument such as the CRAMRA was based on the premise that if mining were to 
be conducted in the Antarctic, it would be prudent to have in place a means of 
regulating it. It was acknowledged at the time that any agreement to regulate 
mining would need to incorporate inter alia an explicit means of allocating 
property rights because commercial investors would demand such assurances.33 
This was one of the sticking points that stalled the negotiations for six years.34 
The Antarctic Treaty parties did eventually agree on legal regulation of mineral 
resource activities through the CRAMRA, which arguably contained some of the 
most thoughtful and wide-ranging environmental provisions of its time. 
However, for a number of the Antarctic Treaty parties — including two of the 
claimants, Australia and France — the final instrument was far from acceptable, 
resulting in their refusal to sign.35 The Antarctic Treaty parties went back to the 
negotiating table with the discord over the CRAMRA’s failure ringing in their 
ears. Then in just two years they turned the issue around completely by 
prohibiting absolutely any activity (other than scientific research) related to 
mining through the mechanism of the Madrid Protocol, and more specifically 
art 7. There is no doubt that this decision to turn the Antarctic ‘green’ was a 
compromise. There seemed to be no chance of reconciling the incongruities that 
unproven sovereignty raised, such as who should profit from commercial mining 
                                                 
 32  Antarctic Treaty, above n 7, art IV reads:  
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:  
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of 
or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;  
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of 
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether 
as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or 
otherwise;  
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its 
recognition or non-recognition of any other State’s right of or claim or 
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No 
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 
 33 See Brennan, above n 30, 224. 
 34 Ibid. 
 35 Sam Blay and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘Australia and the Convention for the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)’ (1990) 26 Polar Record 195, 195–202. 
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in a commons area, providing protection from subsidised (unprofitable) mining, 
payment of licence fees and royalties to claimants without overtly 
acknowledging their sovereign rights to such monies, and allocation of 
compensation for environmental damage. The notion that the Antarctic was a 
global commons, the resources of which were not open to property rights, was 
paramount.36 
Currently, the Antarctic Treaty System prescribes limits on resource use to the 
extent that only regulated marine living resources harvesting shall be carried 
out,37 and mineral resource activity is banned.38 As bioprospecting is an activity 
with potentially both environmental and resource implications, the Antarctic 
Treaty parties need to determine a more comprehensive policy position, if not a 
regulatory framework. The Antarctic Treaty System is, by design, dynamic, 
allowing the Antarctic Treaty parties the flexibility to incorporate new 
regulations as the need arises. At their annual meetings they make 
recommendations for action to be taken by all of the individual state 
governments. As these are made by consensus, agreement may take some time, 
particularly if the action is a meeting measure.39 When discussing the issue of 
bioprospecting, which is on the agenda of the next ATCM in Madrid in June 
2003, one critical question the Antarctic Treaty parties face is where to draw the 
line between the ‘jurisdiction’ of the Antarctic Treaty parties over common 
property resources (resources originating from areas outside national 
jurisdiction) and the right (or even obligation) of researchers and their partners to 
commercialise. The following sections attempt to partially answer this question. 
B Bioprospecting Interest in the Antarctic 
Bioprospectors have been drawn to the Antarctic because its extreme 
environment has led to the evolution of a range of interesting physiological 
adaptations. Antarctic biological resources, particularly the large numbers of 
indigenous Antarctic micro-organisms, are seen as potentially rich sources of 
raw materials for pharmaceutical and other industries.40 There is particular 
interest in the ability of Antarctic micro-organisms to produce polyunsaturated 
fatty acids and cold-active enzymes.41 Because of their biodiversity and their 
relationship with other species that have already been found to produce 
pharmaceutically active compounds, some Antarctic bacteria are the focus of a 
                                                 
 36 Keith Suter, Antarctic Private Property or Public Heritage? (1991) 46. 
 37 CCAS, above n 22, art 2(1); CCAMLR, above n 23, art 3. 
 38 Madrid Protocol, above n 25, art 7. 
 39 The ATCM determinations include ‘measures’ (text containing legally binding obligations), 
‘decisions’ (text regarding international organisational matters) and ‘resolutions’ (for 
example, hortatory text encouraging compliance). 
 40 See generally Richard Laws, ‘Scientific Opportunities in the Antarctic’ in Gillian Triggs 
(ed), The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, Environment and Resources (1987) 28. 
 41 David Nichols, ‘Case Studies of Biotechnology Opportunities in Antarctica’ (Paper presented 
at the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering Symposium — 
Looking South: Managing Technology, Opportunities and the Global Environment, 
November 2001) <http://www.atse.org.au/publications/symposia/proc-2001.htm> at 1 May 
2003. See also Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, above n 1, [3.2]. 
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bioprospecting research program being undertaken by a group of Australian 
scientists.42  
Antarctic yeast are another source of potentially beneficial pharmaceuticals. 
For example, a Russian patent claims a unique multifunctional agent derived 
from a strain of Antarctic black yeast.43 The agent is claimed to be useful in the 
treatment of  
a plurality of functional, organic, structural and sexual pathological and pre-
pathological conditions such as osteochondrosis, arthritis/osteoarthritis, radiculitis, 
various pain syndromes, cardiac and gastroenterological pathologies, 
gynaecological affections, stress, immune problems, psycho-emotional disorders, 
etc.44 
A range of potentially important pharmaceutical compounds are also being 
isolated from Antarctic krill and fish. For example, a US patent45 describes a 
multifunctional enzyme derived from krill and fish that is  
useful for treating viral infections such as herpes outbreaks, fungal, bacterial or 
parasitic infections, including the primary and secondary infections of leprosy, 
colitis, ulcers, haemorrhoids [sic], corneal scarring, dental plaque, acne, cystic 
fibrosis, blood clots, wounds, immune disorders including autoimmune disease 
and cancer.46  
Other patents claim families of antifreeze polypeptides derived from fish and 
other organisms.47  
These examples demonstrate the potential value of Antarctic biological 
resources in the development of products with a range of applications, including 
the alleviation of human suffering caused by ill health and disease. Fulfilling this 
potential will inevitably require investment by the private sector, who will in 
turn seek patent protection to secure a return for their investment. The 
underlying rationale of the patent system, which is examined in the next section, 
is that the grant of a patent gives the holder exclusive rights to the patented 
invention. As such, the holder is granted the right to restrict access to the 
invention. Increasingly, patents are being granted for ‘inventions’ derived from 
naturally occurring material. Confidentiality requirements in the terms of 
agreements between researchers and commercial partners are likely to further 
restrict access to research results. This will be problematic in the Antarctic 
context for a number of reasons, including the obligations of freedom of 
                                                 
 42 See Nichols, above n 41. 
 43 Details of this patent can be accessed from the European Patent Office, Patent Database 
<http://ep.espacenet.com> at 1 May 2003. The patent number is WO0020012 and it was 
filed in 1998. 
 44 European Patent Office, WO0020012: Agent Called ‘Astromelanin’/‘Astronella’ for 
Treating Pathological Conditions (2000) <http://ep.espacenet.com> at 1 May 2003. 
 45 Details of this patent can be accessed from the US Patent and Trademark Office, Patent 
Database <http://www.uspto.gov/main/patents.htm> at 1 May 2003. The patent number is 
5945102 and it was filed in 1995. 
 46 US Patent and Trademark Office, 5945102: Crustacean and Fish Derived Multifunctional 
Enzyme (1999) <http://www.uspto.gov/main/patents.htm> at 1 May 2003. 
 47 See, eg, US Patent 6307020, claiming intracellular antifreeze polypeptides and nucleic acids, 
the details for which can be found at US Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Database. 
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scientific research and the free exchange of scientific observations and results.48 
The process of bioprospecting for Antarctic micro-organisms for the purpose of 
drug discovery thus provides a useful platform for analysis of the complexity and 
controversial nature of bioprospecting in the Antarctic. 
C The Process of Bioprospecting for Antarctic Biological Resources 
The process of bioprospecting can be subdivided into a number of discrete 
phases.49 The phases described here relate specifically to the isolation and 
culture of samples of terrestrial and marine micro-organisms in a laboratory for 
the purpose of drug discovery. It is likely that bioprospecting for other biological 
resources, including terrestrial and marine plants and animals, and for other 
purposes, will follow a similar pattern. However, it is acknowledged that some 
of those resources will be difficult to maintain in the laboratory for successive 
generations, and in some instances, it will be impossible to synthetically produce 
the end product. In such cases, it will be necessary to harvest the resource and 
extract the end product. 
1 Phase 1: Sample Collection 
The collection of samples from the Antarctic is the first phase in the search 
for pharmaceutically active compounds. Collections of sample material are 
presently being gathered from the Antarctic terrestrial and marine environments 
for the purposes of isolating and culturing micro-organisms for potential 
pharmaceutical use, in addition to a range of other uses. 
At the outset it must be acknowledged that sample collection is unlikely to 
have a significant environmental impact and is not inconsistent with 
conservation. Therefore sample collection would not be excluded by the 
instruments dealing with environmental impact such as the Madrid Protocol or 
the CCAMLR. The Madrid Protocol certainly imposes environmental impact 
assessment obligations on researchers collecting samples.50 However, in the case 
of micro-organism samples, only very small quantities are taken (in some cases 
teaspoonfuls) and the activity of collection is almost certain to cause ‘less than a 
minor or transitory impact’ on the environment.51 The same cannot be said for 
harvesting of biological resources for the purpose of extracting target 
compounds. This may well have a significant impact on the environment and 
will therefore be subject to a higher level of environmental impact assessment. 
National legislation may also require permits to be issued for the collection of 
material from protected areas. Australian legislation, for example, requires 
compliance with environmental impact assessment requirements under the 
Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) Act 1980 (Cth) and the issuing of 
permits to import quarantine material into Australia under the Quarantine Act 
1908 (Cth). 
It is likely that the samples will be collected by scientific researchers 
employed by governments or universities. These scientists use their skill and 
                                                 
 48 Antarctic Treaty, above n 7, arts II–III. 
 49 See Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, above n 1, 4. 
 50 Madrid Protocol, above n 25, art 8. 
 51 Ibid art 8(1)(a). 
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knowledge in choosing appropriate samples for collection. Where the collection 
of samples is funded by the public sector, it is likely that access to the samples 
will be available to any researcher worldwide.52 On the other hand, where 
collection is funded by the private sector, it will be regulated by contractual 
provisions, which may prohibit free access.53 This basically provides participants 
with a head start in the second phase of the bioprospecting process. 
2 Phase 2: Isolation, Characterisation and Culture 
In the laboratory, researchers attempt to isolate and characterise micro-
organisms from the collected samples. If this is achieved, an attempt may be 
made to culture the micro-organisms and, in some cases, sequence their DNA.54 
Where this research is funded by the public sector, results will be published 
through normal scientific channels and it is likely that specimens will be made 
available to other researchers on request.55 
Where this research is funded by the private sector, researchers report 
discoveries and provide extracts cultured from micro-organisms to their 
commercial partner. During this phase, the researcher’s institution and/or the 
commercial partner may choose to take out patents on the gene sequences and 
proteins derived from the micro-organisms, and in some instances, even the 
micro-organisms themselves.56 However, this is not always the case — the 
commercial partner may delay patenting until pharmaceutically active products 
are isolated (see phase 3). Irrespective of whether or not patents are taken out, 
the parties may be bound by confidentiality requirements to keep their 
discoveries secret. Patents and contractual confidentiality requirements may limit 
access by other researchers to basic research results. 
It is likely that the contractual arrangements will require that ownership of 
any intellectual property created from the processes of isolating and extracting 
will be assigned to the commercial partner. However, researchers and their 
employers may be entitled to a share in the royalties from future products and are 
likely to retain the background intellectual property. Contractual terms will also 
dictate these matters. It is still open to other researchers to independently access 
the original material and isolate the same micro-organisms. However, this 
requires duplication of research effort and carries the risk of legal liability for 
patent infringement. 
3 Phase 3: Screening for Pharmaceutical Activity 
Screening for pharmaceutical activity will generally be carried out by the 
commercial partner using samples from the original material. Screening will 
identify the potential for a ‘product’ to be developed from the organism 
samples.57 Samples are grown under a range of different conditions and cellular 
                                                 
 52 One example is the ACAM collection in the Department of Agricultural Science at the 
University of Tasmania. 
 53 However, samples may become publicly accessible upon termination of a specific contract. 
 54 See Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, above n 1, [1.10]. 
 55 See ibid [3.15]–[3.17]. 
 56 The legitimacy of patenting these biological resources is discussed further below at part III.  
 57 See Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, above n 1, 4. 
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extracts are removed and screened for biological activity. Thousands of extracts 
are assessed in this way, perhaps resulting in the identification of only one 
potentially pharmaceutically active compound.58 
The screening phase is costly and risky and, unless it is fully automated, it is 
also labour-intensive. It is during this phase that a patent may be sought in 
relation to the pharmaceutically active product. This is also the point at which 
the results of the research effort take on a much more commercial flavour. The 
guarantee of intellectual property rights at this stage provides sufficient incentive 
to continue investing in the research necessary to progress to phase 4 and 
beyond. 
4 Phase 4: Development of Product, Patenting, Trials, Sales and Marketing 
Once activity has been detected, the active compound must be isolated and 
ideally synthetically produced, although this is not always possible.59 If 
resources must be harvested to extract the active compound, the environmental 
impact would need to be assessed. A successful trial product is then subjected to 
a range of procedures to test its safety and efficacy.60 One or more patents, and 
other exclusive intellectual property rights, such as certification trade marks 
using the ‘Antarctic’ brand, would protect this innovative phase, ensuring a 
return on the investment. 
In order to understand the implications of bioprospecting in the Antarctic, it is 
essential to have a basic understanding of how the patent system works, what is 
patentable and how patents can be used. The protection provided by patenting is 
likely to attract criticism because of its potential to curtail freedom of access, 
freedom of scientific research, and benefit sharing. 
III THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Most states in the world (including all of the Antarctic Treaty parties) are 
obliged to have intellectual property laws that comply with TRIPS. Amongst 
other matters, TRIPS sets out the essential requirements for obtaining a patent, 
the allowable exclusions from patenting, and the allowable restrictions on the use 
of patents.61 
Patents are generally justified on the basis that they encourage innovation by 
granting the inventor a period of market exclusivity in which to commercialise 
their invention. Patenting is particularly necessary in the pharmaceutical industry 
for a number of reasons, including the high costs of the research and 
commercialisation phases, and the time lag between invention and marketing that 
arises out of regulatory requirements for drug approvals (generally estimated as 
                                                 
 58 Ibid [3.59]. 
 59 For example, proteins from krill have been found to be particularly difficult to synthetically 
produce: see Stephen Nicol and Yoshinari Endo, ‘Krill Fisheries of the World’ (Fisheries 
Technical Paper 367, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN, 1997) [5.2.8]. 
 60 See Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services, above n 1, 4. 
 61 TRIPS, above n 19, arts 27–34. 
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around 14 years).62 Patents allow for recovery of the costs of research and 
development through monopoly pricing, licence fees and royalty payments. As 
such, it is difficult to find convincing arguments against patenting of 
pharmaceuticals that are derived from biological resources through 
bioprospecting. Similar arguments can also be raised in support of patenting of 
other downstream products of bioprospecting. 
Patenting of living organisms, genes and other like products is more 
controversial, in part because of the perception that this amounts to ownership of 
life.63 Contrary to this popular misconception, the patent system does not grant 
ownership in the traditional sense. The owner of patent number US5945102 does 
not own each and every multifunctional krill enzyme that is naturally produced. 
Nor does the owner of patent number WO0020012 own every naturally 
produced multifunctional yeast agent. Simply put, a krill cannot be accused of 
infringing patent 5945102 by manufacturing its own enzyme. The patent system 
gives patent holders the right to prevent others from exploiting their inventions 
without permission for a limited period, generally 20 years.64 Nevertheless, 
patents can, and often are, drafted in such a way as to foreclose the use of 
naturally occurring materials by anyone except the patent holder. 
A Essential Requirements 
Article 27(1) of TRIPS requires that member states must make patents 
available for any inventions in all fields of technology, bar the exclusions listed 
further in the article.65 To be patentable, inventions must satisfy the following 
criteria: 
1 Industrial applicability or utility: this requires that the invention have a 
commercially useful purpose; 
2 Novelty: one of the most obvious requirements for a patentable invention 
is that it must be new or novel; and 
3 Inventive step: this requires an analysis of the prior art, what has gone on 
before in the field including what is generally known and what is written. 
The question that the inventive step requirement seeks to address is 
whether the teachings from the prior art make the invention obvious to an 
ordinary person skilled in the field. 
Each of these requirements has been subjected to extensive judicial 
interpretation in all states with well established patent systems. Article 29 of 
TRIPS further requires the inventor to fully describe the nature of the invention 
and its scope. For example, depositing a micro-organism in an internationally 
recognised depository fulfils these requirements. With respect to gene sequences, 
                                                 
 62 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, PhRMA Pharmaceutical Industry 
Primer 2001 (2001) 4 <http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/10.08.2001.528.cfm> 
at 1 May 2003.  
 63 See Daniel Kevles and Ari Berkowitz, ‘The Gene Patenting Controversy: A Convergence of 
Law, Economic Interests and Ethics’ (2001) 67 Brooklyn Law Review 233, 240–1; Dan 
Burk, ‘Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective’ (1993) 30 
Houston Law Review 1597, 1599. 
 64 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 13, 67. 
 65 These exclusions are discussed further below at part III(B). 
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generally the entire sequence must be filed with the patent application. This 
requirement to disclose the invention to the public is one of the main 
justifications for the patent system in that it provides a trade-off of temporary 
exclusivity to the inventor in return for disclosure. It is supposed to provide 
sufficient information for others to make and use the invention once the patent 
has expired. 
B Allowable Exclusions under TRIPS 
1 Exclusions Based on Ethical Concerns 
Article 27(3)(a) of TRIPS allows states to exclude inventions when it is 
necessary to prevent the commercial exploitation of the invention to protect 
public order or morality, including protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health and avoidance of serious prejudice to the environment. Some states, 
including Australia and the US, do not include this provision in their patent 
legislation. A number of states in Europe do have an equivalent provision66 but 
the way that it has been interpreted by the European Patent Office precludes 
ethical considerations in all but the most exceptional circumstances. As such, 
patents claiming animals, plants and gene sequences are not generally excluded 
on this basis.67  
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the ethics of patenting naturally 
occurring materials is highly contentious. In 1995, for example, representatives 
of over 80 different faiths and denominations in the US declared their opposition 
to patenting of genetically engineered animals and human genes, cells and 
organs, on the basis ‘that humans and animals are creations of God, not humans, 
and as such should not be patented as human inventions.’68 Subsequently, a 
group of scientists, clergy and activists met in the Blue Mountains in the US and 
proposed that: 
The humans, animals, microorganisms and plants comprising life on earth are part 
of the natural world in which we are born. The conversion of these life forms, 
their molecules or parts into corporate property through patent monopolies is 
counter to the interests of the peoples of the world. 
No individual, institution, or corporation should be able to claim ownership over 
species or varieties of living organisms. Nor should they be able to hold patents on 
organs, cells, genes or proteins, whether naturally occurring, genetically altered or 
otherwise modified.69 
The opposition to patenting of biological inventions on ethical grounds is 
growing and becoming more broadly based. A number of international 
                                                 
 66 See, eg, Patents Act 1977 (UK) s 1(3). 
 67 See, eg, Oncomouse T19/90 [1990] Official Journal of the European Patent Office 476 
(genetically engineered animals); Plant Genetic Systems T356/93 [1995] Official Journal of 
the European Patent Office 545 (genetically engineered plants); and Relaxin [1995] Official 
Journal of the European Patent Office 388 (human genes). 
 68 Richard Stone, ‘Religious Leaders Oppose Patenting Genes and Animals’ (1995) 268 
Science 1126, 1126. 
 69 This quote is extracted from the Blue Mountains Declaration, cited in Philip Bereano, 
‘Genetic Patents’ (1996) 271 Science 14, 14. 
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organisations are turning their attention to this issue (most notably the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation and the World Trade Organisation).70 Nevertheless, unless 
there are significant changes to existing patent practices throughout the world, it 
seems most unlikely that patents claiming products of nature would generally be 
refused on ethical grounds. 
2 Exclusion of Plants and Animals 
Article 27(3)(b) of TRIPS allows for the exclusion from patenting of plants 
and animals and biological processes for their generation. However, micro-
organisms and microbiological processes for the generation of plants and 
animals cannot be excluded.71 On this basis, Antarctic micro-organisms cannot 
be excluded from patenting. Most industrialised states do not expressly exclude 
plants and animals either, although a number of European states exclude plant 
and animal varieties.72 
C Patentability of Naturally Occurring Organisms and Substances 
Although micro-organisms cannot be expressly excluded from patenting and 
most states do not exclude plants and animals, there is an ongoing debate about 
whether naturally occurring organisms and substances isolated from their natural 
surroundings are inventions or discoveries.73 It is important to recall here that art 
27(1) of TRIPS requires that patents are made available only for inventions. 
Patent protection for inventions derived from biological resources has become 
available only relatively recently.74 Patenting of living organisms was first 
allowed in the US in 1980 in the case of Diamond v Chakrabarty.75 In that case, 
Dr Ananda Chakrabarty filed patent claims for a human-made, genetically 
engineered bacterium that was capable of breaking down multiple components of 
crude oil. The invention involved the transfer of four different plasmids capable 
of degrading four different components of oil into a Pseudomonas bacterium. 
The patent application included a number of claims including one to the 
bacterium itself. This claim was rejected by the patent examiner on two bases:  
                                                 
 70 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, International Symposium: Ethics, 
Intellectual Property and Genomics, UN Doc SHS/HPE/2001/CONF-804/3 (19 December 
2002). 
 71 TRIPS, above n 19, art 27(3)(b). 
 72 The question of what constitutes a ‘variety’ has been considered in a number of cases. See, 
eg, Oncomouse T19/90 [1990] Official Journal of the European Patent Office 476, Plant 
Genetic Systems T356/93 [1995] Official Journal of the European Patent Office 545, 
Transgenic Plant/Novartis T1054/96 [1998] Official Journal of the European Patent Office 
511. Transgenic Plant/Novartis II G1/98–EBA (Unreported, European Patent Office, 20 
December 1999) <http://www.european-patent-office.org/dg3/g_dec/pdf/g980001.pdf> at 1 
May 2003. In Transgenic Plant/Novartis, the term ‘variety’ was given a narrow 
interpretation. 
 73 Burk, above n 63, 1625–6. 
 74 See generally Klaus Bosselman, ‘Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime 
Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity (1996) 7 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 111; Stephen Bent et al, Intellectual Property Rights in 
Biotechnology Worldwide (1987) ch 3; Friedrich-Karl Beier et al, Biotechnology and Patent 
Protection: An International Review (1985). 
 75 447 US 303 (1980) (‘Chakrabarty’). 
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1 That micro-organisms are products of nature; and 
2 That as living things they are not patentable subject matter.76 
A number of appeals were made and the case eventually reached the Supreme 
Court. The majority judgment was delivered by Burger CJ, with whom four of 
the other judges on the bench agreed. Burger CJ decided that the task for the 
Court was a narrow one of statutory construction of the US Patent Act, which 
provides that:  
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain 
a patent thereof, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.77  
Burger CJ noted that there are limits on what is patentable. For example, laws of 
nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable.78 After 
considering these factors, his Honour decided that Chakrabarty’s micro-organism 
plainly qualified for a patent on the basis that 
the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics 
from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His 
discovery is not nature’s handiwork but his own, accordingly it is patentable 
subject matter under §101.79 
Chakrabarty has been widely accepted as correctly stating the law both in the 
US and other jurisdictions.80 It has set the benchmark for the patentability of 
inventions derived from living resources. Patent protection is now available in 
many states for a wide range of inventions involving biological resources.81 In 
Australia, for example, the list includes bacteria and other prokaryotes, processes 
involving bacteria and other living organisms, genotypically and phenotypically 
modified living organisms (excluding humans), synthetically manufactured DNA 
and gene sequences with a definite industrial use, and products of living matter, 
provided that the patent application satisfies the normal patent criteria.82  
As mentioned previously, the requirements for patentability of biological 
resources are that the resource (whether it is an organism, a gene sequence or 
some other substance) must have been identified for the first time and it must 
have a commercially useful purpose. This means that micro-organisms and 
higher organisms are likely to be patentable if they have undergone some 
modification from their natural state and if they fulfil all of the patenting 
criteria.83 In the case of gene sequences and proteins, and in some instances, 
                                                 
 76 Ibid 306.  
 77 35 USC §101 (1952) (emphasis added). 
 78 Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 309 (1980). 
 79 Ibid 310. 
 80 See generally Jeffrey Ihnen, ‘Patenting Biotech: A Practical Approach’ (1985) 11 Rutgers 
Computer and Technology Law Journal 407. 
 81 See, eg, Patents Act 1977 (UK), sch 2A, s 76A; Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18. 
 82 Intellectual Property Australia, Australian Patents For: Microorganisms; Cell Lines; 
Hybridomas; Related Biological Materials and Their Use; and Genetically Manipulated 
Organisms (1998) 1–2. 
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even micro-organisms themselves,84 the mere isolation and characterisation may 
be enough for them to be patentable. However, for gene sequences, the 
requirement that a commercially useful purpose is identified generally means 
that the function of the gene must be disclosed and consequently, in general, raw 
gene sequences are not patentable.85  
It is important to acknowledge that although these matters appear settled 
legally, they remain the subject of extensive debate in the policy arena both at 
the national and international levels.86 These debates may, eventually, lead to 
law reform, as a result of which some biological resources may be more broadly 
excluded from patenting. 
D Patent Rights and the Experimental Use Exemption 
As previously stated, a patent provides its owner with the exclusive right to 
exploit the invention claimed in the patent for a limited period.87 The owner can 
also permit or licence others to use the invention, usually on payment of upfront 
licence fees or royalties or a combination of both.88 Patents are granted on a 
national basis. As such, an Australian patent can only be enforced in Australia. 
For this reason, most applicants file for patents in all states in which there is 
likely to be a market for their invention. If a person uses a patented invention in 
a particular state without the permission of the patent owner, the owner can 
institute infringement proceedings in that state and, if successful, recover 
damages or enforce other remedies. 
Importantly in the context of this article, the freedom to carry out research is 
recognised in patent law in some states.89 This means that even if a 
micro-organism or a gene sequence is the subject of a patent, other scientists can 
carry out research using the micro-organism or the gene sequence provided that 
the research is of a non-commercial nature. This protection from infringement — 
known as the ‘experimental use exemption’ — varies between states. The 
difficulty that this creates for individual Antarctic researchers is that they do not 
have any certainty of protection by way of this exemption.  
                                                 
 84 Isolated micro-organisms may be patentable if significant inventive ingenuity is required to 
isolate and characterise them.  Perhaps the best example is the Hepatitis C virus. See, eg, 
European Patent Office, GB2212511: Hepatitis C Virus (1989) <http://ep.espacenet.com> at 
1 May 2003.  This UK patent is entitled Hepatitis C virus and includes in its claim ten 
purified Hepatitis C viruses.  See also, John Conley and Roberte Makowski, ‘Back to the 
Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents 
(Part 1)’ (2003) 85 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 301, 318–19. 
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Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (8th ed, 1st rev, 2003) § 2107 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html> at 1 May 2003. In Europe, it is 
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OJ L 213/13. In Australia, see Intellectual Property Australia, above n 82, 2. 
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patenting: Australian Law Reform Commission, Gene Patenting <http://www.alrc.gov.au/ 
inquiries/current/patenting/index.htm> at 1 May 2003. 
 87 See, eg, TRIPS, above n 19, art 33, where the prescribed time period is stated as 20 years. 
 88 Ibid art 28(2). 
89 John Golden, ‘Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and 
Inventions in the American System’ (2001) 50 Emory Law Journal 101. 
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For example, in Europe, the European Patent Convention expressly states that 
there is exemption from patent infringement for experimental purposes.90 In the 
US, the patent legislation does not expressly refer to such exemption.91 
However, a case law defence of experimental exemption from liability has been 
developed against patent infringement.92 From the outset, the US exemption has 
been narrowly interpreted by the courts.93 Although there was some indication in 
subsequent cases of a willingness to extend its ambit,94 the US Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit recently confirmed that the defence is very narrow and 
strictly limited.95 The Court followed a line of precedent limiting the defence to 
actions performed for ‘amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry.’96 This does not include use that is in any way commercial 
in nature or conduct that is ‘in keeping with the alleged infringer’s legitimate 
business, regardless of commercial implications.’97 Consequently, a public 
research institution could not rely on the defence when a researcher uses a 
patented invention in a research project because it furthers that institution’s 
legitimate business objectives.98 In Australia, there is no statutory experimental 
use exemption and there has been no judicial consideration of whether or not a 
common law exemption exists. 
Presently there is little indication that patent holders are generally enforcing 
their patent rights against researchers of public institutions.99 If they were to 
systematically do so, much of the research conducted in the public research 
arena (including Antarctic research) could at the very least become more 
expensive through the payment of licence fees and also more time consuming 
through licence applications. At the worst, some research may actually be 
prevented if licensing were refused by the patentee. For these reasons, a more 
explicit research exemption in patent legislation is justified in order to ensure 
that research having no commercial implications is not impeded. 
E Patentability of Antarctic Biological Resources 
On current interpretations of patent law in most states, genetically modified 
Antarctic micro-organisms and higher organisms are likely to be patentable 
provided that they fulfil the essential patenting criteria,100 and in some cases, 
                                                 
 90 European Patent Convention, opened for signature 5 October 1973, 1065 UNTS 199, art 53 
(entered into force 7 October 1977) art 64(2). See also Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37, 
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 91 Patents Act, 35 USC §§ 272, 282 (1952). 
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 93 For example in Roche Products Inc v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co, 733 F 2d 858, 863 (ED NY, 
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 96 Ibid 1362. 
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 98 Ibid. 
 99 See John Walsh, Ashish Arora and Wesley Cohen, ‘Working Through the Patent Problem’ 
(2003) 299 Science 1021. 
 100 In Canada, following Oncomouse, even if higher organisms are genetically modified they 
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isolated and characterised Antarctic micro-organisms may be patentable even if 
they have not been modified from their natural state. Gene sequences from 
Antarctic organisms may be patentable if they have a known function and fulfil 
the usual requirements. Downstream products and processes derived from 
Antarctic biological resources will generally be patentable if they fulfil these 
requirements. Opposition to the patenting of inventions originating from 
Antarctic biological resources based solely on ethical grounds is unlikely to 
succeed. The extent to which Antarctic researchers in public institutions could 
rely on the experimental use exemption is uncertain, particularly in Australia and 
the US. 
IV THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR SHARING OF COMMON 
RESOURCES AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS 
What are the consequences of ownership rights, in the form of patents, being 
asserted over biological resources derived from global commons areas? The 
questions are first, whether the assertion of such rights precludes equitable 
sharing of benefits stemming from utilisation of these common resources and 
secondly, whether this is appropriate or not. 
International organisations, non-governmental organisations, academics and 
the media have all focused considerable attention on bioprospecting for 
resources found in a number of developing and least-developed states because of 
the combination of rich genetic diversity and broadly based traditional 
knowledge in agricultural and pharmaceutical practices in those countries.101 
Many people believe that this is a form of biopiracy102 and not legitimate 
bioprospecting.103 In particular, they object to the assertion of patent rights over 
inventions derived from biological resources that have been used as traditional 
medicines for centuries.104 Inventions derived from biological resources in 
global commons areas have not, as yet, come under the spotlight. 
A The Role of the CBD 
Concerns about biopiracy have been alleviated to a certain extent by the CBD. 
The CBD establishes the principal international legal regime for regulating 
access to biological resources. It was opened for signature at the Rio Conference 
on Environment and Development in 1992. The CBD imposes limitations on 
access to biological resources by requiring, inter alia, consent and fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits. The CBD incorporates in its objectives the 
conservation of biological diversity and equitable sharing of the benefits from 
use of genetic resources, including access to and transfer of technology.105 The 
                                                 
 101 Charles McManis, ‘Re-Engineering Patent Law: The Challenge of New Technologies’ 
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ongoing relevance of these objectives was affirmed at the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa.106 Questions of 
access to genetic resources and benefit sharing are seen by the parties to the 
CBD as being critical aspects of the Convention.107 
The provisions relating to access to genetic resources are included in arts 15, 
16 and 19 of the CBD. The focus is primarily on protecting the sovereign rights 
of states over their genetic resources. In particular, art 15 of the CBD declares 
that it is for the state that is the provider of genetic material to determine access 
to that material, but that restrictions on access should not run counter to the 
CBD. This article also requires that financial mechanisms should be established 
with the aim of providing for fair and equitable sharing of research and 
development and the benefits of commercialisation. Article 16 of the CBD 
requires the transfer of technology to developing states on fair and favourable 
terms. It further provides that intellectual property rights should be supportive of 
and not run counter to the objectives of the CBD. Article 19 of the CBD 
encourages the participation of provider states of genetic materials in their 
subsequent development.108 In summary, the CBD requires that the provider 
state be consulted with respect to acquisition of genetic material and shares in 
the profits of patenting. 
The Conference of the Parties to the CBD recommended at its meeting in 
October 2001 that guidelines should be prepared to assist parties in developing 
access and benefit sharing strategies. The Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit-Sharing were drafted by the Ad Hoc Open-Ended 
Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing and adopted at the 6th  
Conference of the Parties to the CBD in April 2002.109 The Bonn Guidelines 
include the objectives of contributing to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity and developing transparent frameworks to facilitate access to 
genetic resources and equitable sharing of benefits.110 Paragraph 13 of the Bonn 
Guidelines calls for each party to designate a national focal point for access and 
benefit-sharing and to make such information available through a clearing-house 
mechanism. The focus is on informed consent and also on access and benefit-
sharing arrangements. 
                                                 
 106 United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, Report of the World Summit on 
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B Applicability of the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines in the Antarctic 
Because the focus of the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines is on state-owned 
resources, biodiversity issues in global commons areas such as the Antarctic and 
the high seas are not dealt with. Article 4 of the CBD assigns jurisdiction to 
parties over their national biological diversity and over processes and activities 
carried out by their citizens beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction. While 
citizens carrying out bioprospecting activities in the high seas, for example, 
could be subject to state regulation, this would represent only an ad hoc and 
possibly inconsistent approach to global commons biodiversity issues, unless 
such state regulation was based on a global regulatory framework.111 
Our concern is that open access areas like the Antarctic and the high seas may 
be vulnerable to exploitation because of increased levels of interest in freely 
available biological resources. For example, it could be argued that Antarctic 
Treaty parties may be entering into contracts to provide biological resources 
when they are not, in fact, entitled to do so — an action discouraged in 
para 16(c)(i) of the Bonn Guidelines. Our concerns are shared by other 
commentators, and international organisations responsible for these areas are 
similarly turning their attention to bioprospecting.112 The Committee for 
Environmental Protection (‘CEP’) established under the Madrid Protocol has 
stated that ‘[t]he complexities and rapid developments in this field were strong 
reasons for the Antarctic community to be preemptive on this issue.’113 
Recognising that it was not in a position to ‘address all the problems’, the 
CEP recommended that Antarctic Treaty parties further consider the issue of 
bioprospecting at their next meeting in 2003.114 With regard to the high seas, the 
Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and Law of the Sea flags deep-sea 
biodiversity and genetic resources of the deep-sea bed beyond national 
jurisdiction and of the high seas as raising important questions.115 Relevant 
considerations include the duties of conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biodiversity. The Report goes on to state that there has been a surge in interest 
and research effort in genetic resources and marine biodiversity.116  
The Bonn Guidelines strive to promote strategies of regional level (as well as 
state level) access and benefit sharing for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity,117 based primarily on the process of prior ‘informed 
consent’.118 This notion cannot be directly applied to states with unproven 
ownership over resources. However, many of the guidelines may be able to be 
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translated into a guiding framework for regulation of common property 
resources. It is timely, therefore, to propose answers to the three questions raised 
in the introduction. 
V DOES THE COMMERCIALISATION OF PUBLICLY FUNDED SCIENCE HAVE THE 
POTENTIAL TO PLACE INAPPROPRIATE LIMITS ON FREEDOM OF SCIENTIFIC 
INVESTIGATION FUNDAMENTAL IN BOTH ANTARCTIC AND HIGH SEAS LAW? 
Three features emerge from the above accounts of Antarctic bioprospecting 
and international patent law. First, there is likely to be commercial involvement 
in bioprospecting in the Antarctic. Secondly, patents are the usual means 
whereby commercial organisations recoup their investment in research. Thirdly, 
Antarctic biological resources can be patented. It is necessary to consider 
whether these factors together have the potential to place inappropriate limits on 
freedom of scientific investigation fundamental in both Antarctic and high seas 
law. As a starting point, the general trend towards commercialisation of 
scientific research will be examined. 
The interplay between public science and private commercialisation is a 
matter of ongoing debate in many areas of biological research, and the influence 
of commercialisation on scientific research cannot be ignored. The 
pharmaceutical and agricultural industries have always been commercial 
ventures, and each sector has conducted its own applied technological research. 
As a result of new developments in biotechnology, both pharmaceutical and 
agricultural companies, together with core biotechnology companies, are 
becoming interested in the earlier basic research phase, perhaps because of the 
perceived need to stake their claims to particular DNA sequences at the outset. 
The other change that is occurring in public research institutions is that many of 
the scientists who are involved in basic research, and for whom academic kudos 
has in the past been sufficient reward, are now required to consider the best ways 
to transfer their technology to industry. Consequently, technology-driven science 
is favoured by funding agencies, institutions and scientists themselves. For 
example, the Australian National Principles of Intellectual Property 
Management for Publicly Funded Research state that ‘[r]esearch institutions, and 
where appropriate, individual researchers, are expected to consider the most 
appropriate way of exploiting the IP generated from publicly funded 
research’.119 
A Commercialisation and the Norms of Science 
The growing imperative to commercialise and patent the products of scientific 
research is radically altering the culture of research, based as it is on what have 
been referred to as the norms and rewards of science, namely, universalism, 
                                                 
 119 Working party comprising the Australian Research Council; the Australian Tertiary 
Institutions Commercial Companies Association; the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ 
Committee; the Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs; the Department of 
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Research Council, National Principles of Intellectual Property Management for Publicly 
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communism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism.120 The tradition of 
rapid publication of results in widely circulated journals is not only the primary 
reward for academic scientists, but is also the dominant measure of academic 
excellence. However, there may now be valid commercial reasons, including the 
possibility of patenting, why the early disclosure of results is not always 
forthcoming. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that commercialisation 
per se need not ultimately cause a decrease in publication rate. On the contrary, 
evidence shows that researchers from government institutes in the US that have 
formal partnerships with industry tend to have higher publication rates than those 
from non-industry aligned institutes.121  
One of the requirements of patenting is that data is kept secret until the patent 
is filed.122 Once the patent has been filed, research data can be published, 
provided that it does not compromise future intellectual property rights. Patent 
law itself also requires disclosure of the nature of the invention.123 However, 
where patents are involved there may be a longer time lag between research and 
publication than would otherwise be the case. Furthermore, scientists may be 
required to enter into confidentiality agreements and obtain approval from 
commercial sponsors before publishing their research results. The norms and 
rewards of science require disclosure of information to allow for its subsequent 
use by others. Confidentiality is premised on the fact that there is no disclosure. 
For this reason the use of confidentiality as a means of retaining control over 
information could create a ‘destructive, anti-intellectual climate’,124 particularly 
if the duration of the obligation of confidence is lengthy. 
B Commercialisation of Antarctic Bioprospecting 
The above patent analysis has shown that patents can be claimed over 
biological resources themselves as well as the downstream products of research 
using those resources. The extent to which researchers in the public sector are 
protected from infringement proceedings for use of patented products and 
processes is unclear. The situation may become more problematic when 
confidentiality obligations require that preliminary research results are kept 
secret. This new closed research culture based on economic imperatives poses 
problems that are fundamentally different from those normally associated with 
research conducted in the public sector.125  
Antarctic scientists have, to some extent in the past, been relieved of the need 
to justify their research on economic grounds because the policy of various 
governments was to use scientific research as a means of maintaining a presence 
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in the Antarctic for sovereignty purposes. The situation is now somewhat 
different. In Australia, for example, one of the four government goals for the 
Australian Antarctic Program is to ‘undertake scientific work of practical, 
economic and national significance’.126 Bioprospecting is clearly a commercial 
venture and patents are likely to play a vital role in encouraging investment in 
innovative Antarctic bioprospecting research and development by ensuring 
return for investment. If there is support for this type of activity in the Antarctic, 
there is strong justification for continuing to allow patents for downstream 
products. However, patents may have a detrimental effect on other scientific 
research in the Antarctic if they are claimed over pre-commercial or upstream 
research products, particularly micro-organisms and gene sequences. This 
detrimental effect is likely to be exacerbated if associated research results are 
protected by confidentiality agreements. 
Even if patents are limited to the downstream products of commercial 
research and development, there may still be detrimental effects if the products 
of upstream research are protected by confidentiality agreements. The concern is 
that while an upstream research product (for example, a particular gene or 
protein isolated from an Antarctic micro-organism) may have value in a specific 
line of pharmaceutical investigation, it may have other important applications, 
both scientific and commercial. Because access is restricted, the full potential of 
the upstream product may not be realised. Restrictions of this kind may be 
contrary to both the general spirit and, more specifically, arts II and III of the 
Antarctic Treaty. 
C The Role of Articles II and III of the Antarctic Treaty  
The Antarctic Treaty parties have a longstanding philosophy regarding the 
free exchange of scientific observations and results.127 This is reflected in the 
Antarctic Treaty itself, specifically in the wording of arts II and III: 
Article II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, 
as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the 
provisions of the present Treaty. 
Article III 
1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in 
Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the 
                                                 
 126 Antarctic Science Advisory Committee, Report to the Parliamentary Secretary for the 
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(October 1997) recommendation 1 <http://www-new.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=3354> at 
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Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and 
practicable:  
a information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica 
shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy of and efficiency of 
operations;  
b scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between 
expeditions and stations;  
c scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be 
exchanged and made freely available.128  
It is possible that the scientific commons that underlies the Antarctic Treaty 
(at least in so far as the Antarctic Treaty parties are concerned) could be 
undermined if access to scientific observations and results from the Antarctic is 
restricted through patent and confidentiality requirements. The terminology ‘to 
the greatest extent feasible and practicable’ allows the Antarctic Treaty parties 
some discretion in the way in which they ‘exchange and make freely available’ 
scientific observations and results from the Antarctic. Is bioprospecting, as 
described here, ‘Antarctic science’? If so, to what extent does commercially 
driven bioprospecting contravene the spirit and intent of the Antarctic Treaty, 
particularly when restrictions are placed on access to Antarctic observations and 
results? 
In order to determine whether or not commercial Antarctic bioprospecting 
could offend against the express provision in art III(1)(c) of the Antarctic Treaty, 
it is necessary to examine whether: 
1 Antarctic bioprospecting falls within the concept of ‘scientific observations 
and results’;  
2 Bioprospecting activity, most of which is carried out in the laboratory, is 
‘from Antarctica’;  
3 Delays in the release of results and observations until patents are filed 
and/or confidentiality obligations come to an end offend the requirement 
that observations and results are freely available, or are protected by the 
provision ‘to the greatest extent feasible and practicable’. 
1 Scientific Observations and Results 
Does bioprospecting fit within the category of activities that could be 
considered to be ‘scientific observations and results’ — or should it more 
properly be considered as data collection for the purposes of resource 
exploration and exploitation? As noted above, art II of the Antarctic Treaty 
articulates as a priority the fundamental freedom of scientific investigation, but 
fails to explicitly define what is meant by this phrase. A clue to the intention of 
the original Antarctic Treaty parties is contained in the text of art II, which states 
that scientific investigation and cooperation should be strived for ‘as applied 
during the International Geophysical Year’ (of 1957–58). Eminent Antarctic 
scientist William Budd has noted that International Geophysical Year 
investigations included meteorology, geomagnetism, aurora and airglow, 
ionospherics, solar activity and other physical sciences, as well as 
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oceanography.129 Budd refers specifically to biology and geology as scientific 
disciplines that have expanded since the International Geophysical Year.130 
Significantly, both have the capacity for commercial application and William 
Bush has cautioned that the Antarctic could become attractive to large 
corporations, over which states have only limited control, as a consequence of 
this capacity.131 He therefore forecasts the possibility of an awkward connection 
between early Antarctic investigations such as those mentioned above, which 
were traditionally ‘non-controversial’, and the more contemporary trend of 
conducting research of ‘economic relevance’.132 
Scientific activity in the Antarctic has undergone a series of transitions from 
the early days of exploration, discovery and description. Five broad categories of 
scientific activity can be defined:  
1 Inquisitive or knowledge-driven Antarctic science, involving much the 
same sort of analysis as in the early days of scientific endeavour. This 
scientific activity is driven by the quest for knowledge for knowledge’s 
sake. The goal is to understand more about the Antarctic, its history, its 
living and non-living resources and the way in which they interact. 
Examples include many of the terrestrial Antarctic programs involving 
living and non-living resources. Technology both underpins and imposes 
limits on the activities undertaken under this banner. 
2 Exploitation-driven Antarctic science, involving scientific activities which 
provide data to assist in developing downstream technologies. Examples 
include surveying for new fish stocks and geological surveys.  
3 Management-driven science, focusing on setting appropriate limits on the 
development of commercial opportunities. This aspect of Antarctic science 
centres on management of Antarctic resources and the environment. It 
includes research to provide data for fisheries stock assessment, ecosystem 
management and environmental impact assessment. The emphasis is on the 
common-good objective of setting appropriate limits on exploitation. 
4 Global science, conducted in the Antarctic as well as other locations. 
Examples include weather forecasting, climate change and ocean 
circulation. In this situation, the Antarctic is the ‘location’ rather than the 
object of the research. 
5 Technological research, which is an essential component in the 
development of commercial opportunities, as distinct from exploitation-
driven science, which is a precursor to that development. There is some 
doubt as to whether technological research is ‘science’ as such. Research 
of this nature may well fall outside the concept of scientific investigation 
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in art II of the Antarctic Treaty. Science is a systematic activity that adds to 
the body of knowledge, whereas technological research seeks to provide 
solutions to an immediate problem so that exploitation can proceed. Much 
of the early work on Antarctic krill falls into this latter category. The 
difficulties in processing huge catches for distant markets required 
extensive technological research, which is demonstrated by the large 
number of patents filed in the late 1970s and 1980s claiming methods for 
shelling krill and extracting meat from krill.133 
It is difficult to put bioprospecting into any single one of these categories. 
Certainly it does not fall within the traditional notion of hypothesis-driven 
science. Nevertheless, it could conceivably fall within a number of the categories 
of science outlined above. Bioprospecting can be seen as inquisitive science 
because the research undertaken in phase 2 adds to the stock of knowledge about 
the Antarctic and the species that make up the living Antarctic world. There is 
also no doubt that bioprospecting is exploitation-driven, because the primary 
purpose of the bioprospecting effort in the Antarctic is for use in downstream 
drug and related technologies. At the same time, bioprospecting could be seen as 
pure technology research, because it seeks to provide a solution to the immediate 
problem of drug discovery. 
This difficulty has been highlighted with respect to the distinction between 
marine scientific research and commercially oriented investigations of marine 
biological resources in the deep-sea bed.134 Article 87(1)(f) of LOSC enshrines 
marine scientific research as a fundamental freedom. It further elaborates the 
rules in part 13, with art 257 specifically referring to uninhibited research in ‘the 
water column beyond the exclusive economic zone’, that is, the high seas. As 
with scientific investigation under the Antarctic Treaty, LOSC does not explicitly 
define ‘marine scientific research’ and therefore offers no legal demarcation 
between scientific and technological research in the context of bioprospecting.  
Alfred Soons proposes a narrow definition of marine scientific research. He 
says it ‘can be defined as any scientific investigation having as object the marine 
environment (water column and atmosphere above it, seabed and subsoil).’135 He 
specifically excludes ‘resource exploration (including prospecting for mineral 
resources) and fisheries, research involving fishing’ and ‘hydrographic 
surveys’.136 These exclusions seem to be based on what we have called 
‘exploitation-driven science’. Following from these exclusions, bioprospecting 
could be placed in the same category as prospecting for mineral resources. 
However, these activities that Soons excludes would produce data with multiple 
applications. For example, fisheries science could not only lead to identification 
of commercial stocks but also add to the body of scientific knowledge about the 
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species. How relevant Soons’ definition and his exclusions are in the context of 
bioprospecting, is yet to be determined. 
A broad approach to interpretation of art III(1)(c) would suggest that phases 1 
and 2 of bioprospecting, as outlined above, are scientific investigation, but this is 
more unlikely for phases 3 and 4. On Soons’ interpretation, none of the phases 
would be included (at least for marine bioprospecting). The question of whether 
or not bioprospecting is scientific investigation is important, because if it is, then 
there is an obligation on Antarctic Treaty parties to make observations and 
results freely available. However, this is not an easy question to answer. Based 
on the broad interpretation, art III(1)(c) would impose reporting obligations on 
researchers from Antarctic Treaty parties for phases 1 and 2 of bioprospecting, 
but not for phases 3 and 4. Researchers from non-Antarctic Treaty parties would 
not have these obligations. On Soons’ interpretation, there would be no reporting 
obligations for marine bioprospecting in the Southern Ocean. 
2 From Antarctica 
Even if bioprospecting, or at least phase 2 of bioprospecting, is considered to 
be scientific investigation, in order for it to come within the ambit of art III(1)(c) 
of the Antarctic Treaty, it must also be categorised as ‘scientific observations 
and results from Antarctica.’ Micro-organisms and other Antarctic samples that 
are isolated and cultured in phase 2, as described above, may have passed 
through many generations during their transit from the Antarctic to the 
researcher’s home laboratory. The question that must be addressed is whether 
this means that any of the observations and results from this phase of research 
are still ‘from the Antarctic’ or not. 
Much of the science conducted under the banner of ‘Antarctic science’ is not 
in fact conducted in the Antarctic. Samples, data and other information collected 
in the Antarctic will generally be taken back to home laboratories for analysis. 
Samples will be physically transported by ship or air, and satellite or other 
remote means may send data. Does the fact that the observations and results of 
these scientific endeavours originate in home laboratories mean that they are not 
‘from the Antarctic’? We doubt that this is the case. Whilst research conducted 
on Antarctic penguins that have been bred in captivity in Edinburgh Zoo for a 
number of generations could hardly be said to be ‘from the Antarctic’, the same 
could not be said for samples collected in the Antarctic and transported directly 
to a researcher’s home laboratory. 
3 Freely Available, to the Greatest Extent Feasible and Practicable 
Article III(1)(c) of the Antarctic Treaty requires that Treaty parties exchange 
and make freely available scientific observations and results from the Antarctic, 
‘to the greatest extent feasible and practicable’. Commercial bioprospecting 
agreements will generally require confidentiality and non-disclosure obligations 
to protect downstream intellectual property and to ensure that the commercial 
partner retains their head start in assessing the commercial potential of the 
specimens supplied to it. However, generally once any relevant patent 
applications have been filed and the bioprospecting contract has come to an end, 
the research partner will be free to publish research results and share materials 
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with other researchers. The question that must be asked here is whether the delay 
in exchange of observations and results for the contract period is objectionable or 
whether the caveat mentioned above legitimises such delay. 
Article III(1)(c) imposes no time limits on the requirement that observations 
and results are exchanged. During the CRAMRA negotiations in the 1980s, one 
commentator made the following observation about geological information 
collected by Antarctic Treaty parties:  
Although the laboratory processing of much of this data may require a 
considerable length of time, and some measurements may perhaps never be made 
public, their overall value is available for purposes of scientific research and 
dialogue.137  
On the contrary, private fishing interests are not expected to report data such as 
precise location of target fish stocks that is considered to be commercial-in-
confidence despite the reporting requirements under the CCAMLR. Similarly, the 
CRAMRA would have had confidentiality provisions in its reporting 
requirements for minerals prospecting.138 
There may be circumstances when scientific observations and results are of 
such fundamental importance that delay in their release would be contrary to the 
spirit of arts II and III.139 The question is whether this situation is likely to arise 
in relation to the sample collection phase of bioprospecting, any more so than it 
would for other, non-commercial science. At present, it is apparent that a major 
source of interest in bioprospecting is coming from pharmaceutical companies in 
their quest to discover new pharmaceutical products.140 Delay in release of 
observations and results may be justified on the basis that it enables a company 
investing in bioprospecting in the Antarctic to protect its investment from 
competing companies. However, this should not be at the cost of free access to 
microbial cultures, sequence information and the like for the purpose of 
legitimate scientific research.141 If free access were denied, this would most 
likely be considered a breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of art III(1)(c) of the 
Antarctic Treaty. 
4 Conclusions on the Interpretation of Article III(1)(c) 
This analysis has shown that it is difficult to unequivocally characterise 
bioprospecting as science or technology and as Antarctic or non-Antarctic 
science. The precise nature of the disclosure requirements imposed on Antarctic 
Treaty parties by art III(1)(c) is also uncertain. Consequently, it is difficult to 
reach any final conclusion on the issue of whether bioprospecting contracts 
imposing limitations on the disclosure of research findings are contrary to the 
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obligation in art III(1)(c) to exchange and make freely available scientific 
observations and results from the Antarctic. Resolution of these issues will 
require extensive debate and analysis of the core ideologies of science, the 
underlying philosophy of the Antarctic Treaty and the background to the drafting 
of arts II and III.  
Irrespective of whether or not bioprospecting offends against the strict 
wording of arts II and III of the Antarctic Treaty, if claims to intellectual 
property rights over Antarctic resources offend the way that Antarctic Treaty 
parties view the underlying philosophy of the Antarctic Treaty, then they should 
act now to clarify this issue. The Antarctic Treaty parties will need to address the 
fundamental question of whether it is appropriate to allow commercial use of 
Antarctic biological resources, particularly where that use has the potential to 
benefit humanity, and if so, how this might be achieved. Is it anachronistic to 
expect Antarctic science to continue in a vacuum? Considerable work is still 
required to clarify the issues and make recommendations on how to treat 
bioprospecting in the high seas. A conference planned for December 2003, 
‘Deep Sea 2003’, has an opportunity to examine some of the issues surrounding 
this activity and to make recommendations for future action.142 
D Other Laws 
The assistance to be gained from analysing extant international law is limited 
primarily because although these agreements promote freedom of scientific 
investigation, such investigation is not limited to investigating resources that are 
owned by sovereign states. The CBD, based as it is on sovereign ownership, and 
the Bonn Guidelines, are silent on the issue of access to genetic resources when 
no ownership rights exist. As such, they do not provide guidance in areas like the 
Antarctic or the high seas, except in so far as principles within both can be 
incorporated into any regulatory framework in the future. 
VI SHOULD THERE BE LIMITATIONS ON OWNERSHIP RIGHTS OVER BIOLOGICAL 
RESOURCES FROM GLOBAL COMMONS AREAS TO ENSURE THAT BENEFITS 
ARE SHARED EQUITABLY AMONG HUMANKIND? 
Having established that the Antarctic and the high seas are global commons 
areas, largely insulated from expansive resource use by a variety of legal 
instruments, is it appropriate to further restrict resource use by imposing limits 
on ownership rights? As discussed earlier, Antarctic sovereignty is not proven in 
international law, although it is a fact within the national legislation of claimant 
states. Antarctic sovereign neutrality is, therefore an imposing hurdle. To 
illustrate this point, during the CRAMRA negotiations, it was suggested that one 
way forward in appeasing the concerns of outsiders about the Antarctic Treaty 
parties’ rights over Antarctic mineral resources was that ‘sovereignty will have 
to find an alias’.143  
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Furthermore, provisions within LOSC mean that no state may claim 
sovereignty over any part of the high seas144 or claim any part of the marine 
environment or its resources by virtue of marine scientific research activities 
conducted there.145 Commercial harvesting is another fundamental freedom of 
the seas146 that is qualified only to the extent that other treaty obligations and 
conservation and management strategies are concurrently fulfilled by harvesters. 
It may be decided that other biological resources from the high seas, such as 
those targeted by bioprospecting activity, should be treated as open access, 
common property resources like fish. If this occurs, these resources need 
limitations on ownership rights just like fish have acquired through the various 
regional management agreements applicable to some of the world’s oceans. 
Greater protection could therefore be gained by giving marine biological 
resources, other than commercially harvested species, the same special status 
granted to the mineral resources of the deep-sea bed — ‘the Area’ — that is, 
resources to be the common heritage of humankind.147 
There is a major difference between bioprospecting for resources in commons 
areas and in areas of national jurisdiction. Where resources are found in the 
territory of a particular state they could be said to be owned by that state, and 
bioprospecting without permission could be seen as theft. For this reason, the 
requirement of informed consent is a central tenet of the regime created by the 
CBD as elaborated in its Bonn Guidelines. Where resources are found in a global 
commons area, they could be said to be owned by no-one and hence there is 
no-one to steal them from. The counterargument is that they are owned by 
everyone and hence they should not be used at all. Alternatively, if they are used, 
the benefits arising out of that use should be shared equitably and they should 
still be available for others to use. 
Clearly, then, there are layers of legal uncertainty where claims are made over 
biological resources sourced from areas where there is no legally proven 
ownership of the resource. In this sense, issues surrounding acquisition of 
biological resources from the Antarctic and the high seas are analogous. 
Questions arise as to whether any biological resources from these areas should be:  
1 Open for use by anyone to the extent that the resource becomes depleted 
— the tragedy of the commons;  
2 Open for use and ownership by anyone to the extent that access by others 
is restricted — the new commercial era;  
3 Not open for use or ownership — closed commons; or 
4 Available to all without depletion but with only limited ownership rights, 
ensuring on-going access by others and benefit sharing opportunities — 
the true global commons. 
Currently, the situation in both the Antarctic and the high seas could be 
construed as being tenuously consistent with the first example above. That is, 
that material is open for use by anyone, who may then gain financial benefit 
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from value-adding. The case of high seas fishing illustrates this point. The 
fundamental freedom to fish embodied in LOSC is modified by instruments of 
international law such as the CCAMLR, which set limits on the concept of global 
commons access — in this case in order to conserve Antarctic marine living 
resources. However, the CCAMLR Commission’s jurisdiction over Antarctic 
waters is simply not universally recognised — these waters are deemed ‘high 
seas’ by those conducting illegal, unreported and unregulated (‘IUU’) fishing.148 
IUU is suspected of reaping harvests in greater quantities than legal or 
authorised activities, thereby undermining the authority of the Commission. Of 
significant concern is the fact that vessel origin is often disguised through flags 
and companies of convenience.149 When IUU activities occur in the territorial 
waters of sovereign states (the sub-Antarctic island territories of Australia or 
France, for example), jurisdiction is exercised and the operators of the vessels, if 
caught, are prosecuted through national laws. However, where IUU fishing 
occurs within the CCAMLR area of application, the Commission can exercise 
limited authority over states parties to the CCAMLR only. In other words, 
compliance is voluntary, and non-CCAMLR states essentially have unrestricted 
access. There has been no better illustration of the tragedy of the commons than 
the state of the world’s fisheries resources. 
In considering how to move forward over bioprospecting in areas outside 
national jurisdiction, if the imposition of limitations on ownership rights is 
considered essential to controlling resource use, then a regime for management is 
indicated. 
VII SHOULD BIOPROSPECTING IN AREAS OUTSIDE NATIONAL JURISDICTION BE 
REGULATED AND IF SO, HOW? 
Bioprospecting in the Antarctic and the high seas is likely to be a focus of 
public debate for two main reasons. First, there is a perception in some sectors of 
society that bioprospecting is inextricably linked to biopiracy, and therefore, 
bioprospecting in any guise will cause concern.150 Second, the perception of the 
Antarctic and the high seas as being global commons protected from harmful, 
exploitative activities and dedicated to unrestricted scientific research does not 
marry well with commercial involvement in bioprospecting. Do these concerns 
have any foundation? 
In some respects, bioprospecting for the purposes of product development in 
the laboratory could be considered to be an ideal industry for the Antarctic and 
the high seas. In general, the sample collection and laboratory phases are not 
likely to pose problems relating to over-exploitation and thus, have an impact on 
biodiversity. Commercial involvement may actually enhance the opportunity for 
scientific observation if it provides much needed additional funding. 
Furthermore, in combination, the patent disclosure requirements and 
                                                 
 148 See Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Illegal, 
Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/sc/fish-monit/ 
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 149 See Greenpeace Australia Pacific, Pirates Plunder Our Ocean 
<http://www.greenpeaceusa.org/media/publications/ccamlrtext.htm> at 1 May 2003. 
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experimental use exemption (if clarified) potentially allow for exchange of and 
access to research results. 
On the other hand, companies involved in bioprospecting are primarily 
concerned about profits. Decisions regarding whether or not to pursue particular 
lines of inquiry will be made on commercial grounds and consequently 
information that may have great scientific value could be buried for many years 
as a result of strict confidentiality requirements. Bioprospecting may not always 
be benign. As we have established, in some circumstances it may be more 
economically sound to harvest resources and extract pharmaceutically active 
compounds than to make them synthetically (for example, krill enzymes are 
notoriously difficult to produce in the laboratory, as previously mentioned). 
There is also the issue that companies are profiting from publicly funded 
research, whether it is through the use of public research facilities, the expertise 
of researchers in public institutions, or the use of facilities at Antarctic bases or 
on board Antarctic ships. Finally, broad patent claims over upstream research 
products and confidentiality requirements are perhaps the most contentious 
aspects of private sector involvement in research involving naturally occurring 
materials. Should bioprospecting in commons areas be regulated? The authors 
think that the answer to this is unequivocally yes, although the Antarctic Treaty 
parties, for example, may have a different view. 
The Antarctic Treaty parties are attempting to regulate fishing, mining and 
other human activities and are, in effect, endeavouring to establish a true global 
commons. However, because current bioprospecting activities (sample 
collections) are environmentally innocuous, they are largely unregulated and this 
situation ignores the potential for industry expansion or diversion into resource 
harvesting. Currently, the Antarctic Treaty parties need comply with only 
minimal Environmental Impact Assessment and other regulatory requirements in 
satisfying their legal obligations with regard to sample collection. As for non-
parties, until proven otherwise under customary international law, they owe no 
allegiance to the Antarctic Treaty System and are therefore not regulated (except 
to the extent that their own national laws impose restrictions on citizens). If one 
holds the view that the Antarctic is a true global commons, resources should not 
be appropriated by anyone, but rather, should be available to all with only 
limited ownership rights, ensuring ongoing access by others and benefit sharing 
opportunities. This, in our opinion, is the intent of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Intellectual property and confidentiality requirements have the effect of creating 
de facto ownership rights. If material is to remain available to all, when, how, 
under what conditions and under whose authority could this occur? 
The Antarctic Treaty parties have a range of mechanisms at their disposal 
with which to achieve regulation of bioprospecting. For example, it is possible to 
amend the Madrid Protocol by the addition of annexes. An annex on 
bioprospecting would require extensive debate leading to consensus on its need, 
form and function.151 A more simple solution in the short term would be for the 
Antarctic Treaty parties to agree on the wording of a ‘measure’ — a legally 
                                                 
 151 However, the Antarctic Treaty parties do not have a good track record in this regard. An 
annex on liability for environmental damage, which began its life in the CRAMRA and was 
transferred to art 16 of the Madrid Protocol, has been on the drawing board since 1991 and 
no resolution is in immediate sight.  
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binding text with less content but no less obligation than a Protocol annex. In the 
Antarctic marine context it may be much easier to harness an existing regime 
like the CCAMLR to regulate the sample collection phase of bioprospecting than 
to get international agreement on a new regime. The CCAMLR, as it exists now, 
could regulate the collection of Antarctic marine micro-organisms because its 
scope is ‘the populations of finfish, molluscs, crustaceans and all other species of 
living organisms, including birds’.152 Sample collections per se would not 
contravene any existing CCAMLR provisions. Furthermore, if bulk harvesting of 
micro-organisms from the CCAMLR area were carried out by CCAMLR 
members, it would come directly under CCAMLR regulation in the same way 
that Southern Ocean fishing does now. This is convenient, but not without its 
problems; if the activity were conducted by parties outside the CCAMLR, the 
same issues that the CCAMLR faces with regard to IUU fishing would arise. 
VIII RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD 
Bioprospecting and downstream product development are not new; for 
decades, the commercialisation of science has occurred through these processes. 
However there has been scant debate about these issues in the Antarctic and high 
seas contexts. Collections of Antarctic micro-organisms are being used for the 
purpose of bioprospecting, and yet the Antarctic Treaty parties have not fully 
canvassed the issues surrounding the utilisation of these kinds of Antarctic living 
resources. 
Bioprospectors have found the Antarctic to hold potentially rich sources of 
raw materials for the pharmaceutical and other industries and their value is 
inestimable. The Antarctic Treaty was built on a solid foundation of cooperative 
science first encountered during the International Geophysical Year, and this 
spirit has generally been maintained for the 42 years of the Antarctic Treaty’s 
existence. The spirit is not only philosophical; there is a legal obligation as well. 
The way that the Antarctic Treaty parties deal with emerging challenges is for 
the most part commendable. In the past they have framed agreements to deal 
with new issues in a more or less precautionary manner. Although the CCAS was 
reactive management to the exploitation of seals, it envisaged a return to 
commercial seal harvesting and sought regulation of such an event. The 
CRAMRA was established before any mining was envisaged and failed largely 
on rights allocation issues. The CCAMLR anticipated a krill harvest potentially 
damaging to the virtually unknown Antarctic marine ecosystem and sought a 
more holistic approach to resources management. The Madrid Protocol 
envisaged the Antarctic as ‘a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science’153 
and has the objective of the ‘comprehensive protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems’.154 Bioprospecting has 
not yet touched a serious nerve among the Antarctic custodians. This article 
suggests, however, that maybe now is the time for them to consider at the very 
least a policy position, if not a more overarching regulatory framework, in order 
to fulfil the obligations they have set for themselves. A dedicated regulatory 
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regime will clarify rights and duties; it will also benefit stakeholders by 
‘instilling confidence in the current and potential investors in such 
commercially-oriented activities in that it could promote legal certainty and 
predictability, an important element in any commercial venture.’155 
The patent process and the generalised terms of agreements between 
researchers and commercial partners described in this article impose restrictions 
and confidentiality requirements that limit access by other researchers. There are 
compelling reasons to conclude that Antarctic inventions, particularly proteins 
and gene sequences, will generally fulfil all patent requirements and will 
therefore not be excluded from patenting. Indeed, as this article has illustrated, 
patents already exist. Confidentiality agreements almost certainly exist as well, 
as they are a common term of agreement. This means that there may be a conflict 
brewing between the notion of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean (or high seas) 
as a global commons and the imperative many researchers face to commercialise 
aspects of their work. Whilst other researchers may be free to continue their own 
independent studies, they may not necessarily be able to rely on the 
‘experimental use exemption’ to avoid patent infringement. Moreover, 
confidentiality requirements may hinder free access to original material, or even 
equitable and affordable access. 
The legal and policy issues are likely to become more troublesome as the 
bioprospecting industry develops. Consequently, it would be in the best interests 
of the Antarctic Treaty parties to prioritise the development of a policy position 
on bioprospecting with a view to developing a legal regime in the future. It is 
acknowledged that such an outcome will only be arrived at by consensus. 
However, consensus may be difficult to achieve without further research 
examining in greater detail the issues raised here. There are a number of ways to 
achieve a satisfactory regulatory outcome:  
1 Commercial developers could be required to pay a fee for access to 
Antarctic material and this fee could be deposited into a common fund 
administered by the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat. Perhaps the successful 
development of downstream products should attract royalty payments, also 
deposited into a common fund. In this regard, there are a number of 
precedents that may provide guidance on how a multinational regime could 
be set up for ensuring facilitated access to Antarctic resources and benefit 
sharing. In particular, three components in the appendices to the Bonn 
Guidelines relating to material transfer agreements, monetary and non-
monetary benefits and capacity building would seem relevant. The purpose 
of the fund would be to sponsor ongoing scientific cooperation. 
2 All Antarctic samples could be deposited in a common receptacle, to which 
any researcher, anywhere in the world, could have access for non-
commercial research. The clearing house mechanism in paragraph 13 of 
the Bonn Guidelines could provide a framework for this. 
3 Individual Antarctic Treaty parties could create their own regimes for 
depositing Antarctic samples and making them available to commercial 
and non-commercial researchers in accordance with standardised terms. 
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This arrangement would be similar to that envisaged by the Bonn 
Guidelines in its advice on national focal points. 
4 Individual institutions could enter into their own negotiations with 
commercial partners, which is the current position. If this option is chosen, 
institutions should be educated on the value of the resources that they are 
bargaining with and the nature of the restrictions that are being imposed on 
their own research and research undertaken by others. 
5 Some mechanism for licensing ‘brand Antarctic’ should be considered, for 
example through the certification trade mark process in the Australian 
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). There is growing recognition internationally 
of the intrinsic value of traditional knowledge and the therapeutic use of 
natural resources by indigenous communities, now formally acknowledged 
through the CBD and the Bonn Guidelines. In our view, material 
originating in the Antarctic should be similarly acknowledged as being 
unique and beneficial to humankind. Accordingly it should have a value 
attached to it as a means of securing sustainable development of Antarctic 
resources into the future. 
6 For the Antarctic Treaty parties to retain control over access, use and 
benefit sharing of the resource, there would need to be some requirement 
in the patent application process to confirm the origin of the biological 
material and arrangements for access and benefit sharing. 
In formulating a policy and legal framework, it is essential to find an 
appropriate balance between supporting the potential of the emerging industry to 
develop products for the good of humankind and maintaining the integrity of the 
global commons. In the case of the Antarctic (and the high seas to the extent of 
CCAMLR jurisdiction), the Antarctic Treaty parties have the right, and indeed 
the obligation, to take these matters into their own hands with due regard to other 
international obligations. They could, for instance, revisit the CRAMRA for 
insight into specific questions on the definitions of terms such as prospecting, 
commercialisation, operators, sponsoring states, joint ventures, effective control, 
reporting and other obligations. Although the CRAMRA did not enter into force, 
and was replaced by the Madrid Protocol, it was a consensus document and 
perhaps it still has relevance. 
